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  1Abstract 
 
 
Two key stylised facts have been established about the extinction patterns of firms.  
First, the probability of extinction is highest at the start of the firm’s existence, but 
soon becomes more or less invariant to the age of the firm.  Second, a very recent 
finding, that the relationship between the size and frequency of firm extinctions is 
closely approximated by a power law. 
 
Economic theory has a great deal to say about many aspects of firm behaviour, but 
offers relatively little on the deaths of firms.  An agent based model of firm evolution 
and extinction has been developed which has properties which conform closely to the 
stylised facts.  However, in this model, firms are unable to acquire knowledge about 
either the true impact of other firms’ strategies on its own fitness, or the true impact 
of changes to its own strategies on its fitness. 
 
We examine the effects of allowing firms different amounts of knowledge about the 
effects of strategy in the context of the agent-based evolutionary model.   We 
investigate the emergent properties of the system in terms of the relationship between 
the size and frequency of firm extinction, and the survival patterns with respect to the 
age of agents.  In other words, we compare the properties of the model with the two 
key stylised facts. 
 
There are very considerable returns in the model to acquiring knowledge.  There is a 
sharp increase in the mean agent age at extinction for agents with even a small 
amount of knowledge compared to those without.  Indeed, we find that as both the 
amount of knowledge available to firms increases and as the number of firms capable 
of acquiring such knowledge rises, the lifespan of agents begins to approach the 
limiting, full information paradigm of neo-classical theory in which agents live for 
ever.   
 
However, even with relatively low levels of knowledge and numbers of agents capable 
of acquiring it, the model ceases to have properties which are compatible with the two 
key stylised facts on firm extinctions.  The clear implication is that firms have very 
















  21. Introduction 
 
Economic theory has a great deal to say about many aspects of firm behaviour, but 
offers relatively little on the deaths of firms.  For example, in the context of general 
equilibrium theory, in an n-period world agents act as if they have perfect foresight 
about the best strategy to follow in any future state of the world [1].  The proof of 
existence of equilibrium requires that each agent has an infinite amount of knowledge. 
In such a world, an agent such as the firm never disappears.   
 
Slightly more realistically, a firm could be assumed to have perfect information up to 
and including the current period, and to act as a rational maximiser in determining its 
strategy.  However, a firm could now become extinct because of its failure to 
anticipate future random shocks.  Certainly, empirical studies of firm growth and size 
have emphasised the importance of stochastic influences, from the initial work of 
Gibrat [2], through classic papers of the 1950s and 1960s (for example, [3,4]), to 
much more recent contributions [5,6].  But the literature of the deaths of firms is 
surprisingly sparse.  Some empirical studies relate firm deaths within individual 
industries to factors such as the number of firms in the industry at the time the firm 
enters ([7], for example, provides examples and cites others).  But no general analysis 
of deaths appears to be available. 
 
There do, however, appear to be two important stylised facts about firm extinctions.  
First, it has been known for some time (for example, [7,8]) that the probability of 
extinction is highest in the early life of a firm, but declines rapidly and is thereafter 
more or less invariant with respect to the lifespan of the firm. 
 
Second, it has been shown recently, that the empirical relationship between the 
frequency and size of firm extinctions is described well by a power law.   Analyses of 
a database of 6 million US firms by state and industry in the 1980s and 1990s [9] and 
of a database of eight OECD countries over the 1977-99 period [10] both give 
estimates of the exponent of the power law of –2.   Over a longer time-scale, analysis 
of the experiences of the largest 100 industrial firms in the world in 1912 over the 
1912-95 period gives an estimate of –1.75 [11]. The empirical relationship is well-
grounded. 
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An agent-based model of the evolution and extinction of firms has been developed 
[10] which has properties which conform closely to the empirical evidence exhibited 
in these two stylised facts, namely: 
•  the relationship between the size and frequency of firm extinctions is closely 
approximated by a power law 
•  the probability of extinction is highest at the start of the firm’s existence, but 
soon becomes more or less invariant to the age of the firm 
 
  In this paper, we examine the effects of allowing firms different amounts of 
knowledge about the effects of strategy in the context of the agent-based evolutionary 
model.   We investigate the emergent properties of the system in terms of the 
relationship between the size and frequency of firm extinction, and the survival 
patterns with respect to the age of agents.  In other words, we compare the properties 
of the model with two key stylised facts. 
 
We obtain a permissible set, as it were, of the different amounts of knowledge which 
agents are assumed to possess, and which generate properties which are compatible 
with the stylised facts on firm extinction.  Assumptions about the amount of 
knowledge available to agents which lie outside this set lead to the model being no 
longer able to replicate the stylised facts. 
 
Section 2 describes the theoretical agent-based model, and section 3 discusses how 
knowledge and intent are introduced into agent behaviour.  Section 4 sets out the 













The model contains N agents, and every agent is connected to every other.  The model 
evolves in a series of steps.  The rules of the model specify a) how the connections are 
updated b) how the fitness of each agent is measured c) how an agent becomes extinct 
and d) how extinct agents are replaced.  The overall properties of the model emerge 
from the interactions between agents. 
 
The connections between agents can be thought of as representing the way in which 
the net impacts of the overall strategies of firms impact on each other.  Both the 
strength and the signs of the connections vary.  Each firm can be thought of as 
attempting to maximise its overall fitness level. In the model, the firm proceeds by a 
process of trial-and-error in altering its strategy with respect to other firms.  The 
model is solved over a sequence of iterated steps, and at each step, for each agent one 
of its connections is chosen at random, and a new value is assigned to it. 
 
 
2.2 The  theoretical  model:  a more formal statement 
 
The model consists of a population of N agents which are considered to influence 
each other via a matrix of uniformly distributed interconnections Jij ∈ [-1, 1] , where 
Jij is the effect of  agent i upon agent j.   
The model can be summarised as follows. 
1.  Jij is initialised by drawing at random from a uniform distribution on [-1, 1] 
 
2. Each  agent  i has one of its Jji updated, i.e. assigned with a new value chosen at 
random in the interval [-1, 1]  





ji i t J t F
1
) ( ) (  
4. If  Fi(t) < 0 then the agent is deemed extinct and its interconnections are 
obsolete, i.e.  Jij = 0 and Jji = 0 ∀ j. 
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5.  Extinct agents are then replaced. A random "parent" k  is chosen from the 
surviving agents. Each replacement agent i is assigned new connections such 
that : 
Jij = Jkj + εij  and Jji = Jjk + εji  , where εij is a small random number drawn from 
a uniform distribution [-εmax , εmax]. 
 
6.  Steps 2 to 5 are repeated for n iterations.  
 
It is important to emphasise that the Jij are not simply the cross-price elasticities 
which might be estimated between products in, say, a Nearly Ideal Demand System 
[see, for example, 13].  They represent the net effect of a firm i's overall strategy on 
firm j, and not just the impact of relative price.  Competition between agents, for 
example, is the broad concept noted in [14], where it is defined as 'a rivalry between 
individuals (or groups or nations), which arises whenever two or more parties strive 
for something that all cannot obtain.'  Price may certainly be an element in defining 
the value of the connection from agent i to agent j, but so is, for example, advertising, 
R and D and effort levels. 
 
The overall fitness of an agent is measured by the sum of its connections to all other 
agents
1.  More exactly, it is the sum of influences on each agent of all other agents.   
Fitness in this context is fitness for survival, and is a wider concept than, for example, 
just volume of sales or profits.  There are many examples in business history of very 
large firms with high levels of profits which have collapsed very rapidly due to drastic 
mistakes of strategy by the management 
 
Three combinations of pair-wise connections are possible in terms of the signs of the 
Jij: i) Jij, Jji > 0;  ii) Jij > 0, Jji < 0, or vice versa; and iii) Jij ,Jji< 0    
 
                                                 
1 these include the connection of the product/firm to itself, as it were, the Jii.  A firm may possess 
qualities which lead to positive or negative effects on its own fitness.  For example, a firm may attempt 
to occupy a niche for which, in any given period,  the demand is very weak, and is therefore 
handicapped in its attempts to survive.  The properties of the model are in any event not affected in any 
significant way if the Jii are set equal to zero. 
  6Case (i) represents a situation in which firms benefit from each other's presence in a 
market. The situation could arise through co-operation or tacit collusion.  More 
generally, the signs will be the same when two firms carry out activities which are 
complimentary to each other.  From a theoretical perspective, Chamberlin [15] 
argued, in the context of his theory of monopolistic competition, that 'As for the 
conventional categories of industries, it seems increasingly evident to me that they 
have their origin, not primarily in substitution at all but in similarity...'.   
 
Case (ii) arises when two products are in competition, and the overall strategy of one 
is such that it gains fitness at the expense of its rival.  Case (iii) is a more intense 
example of the competitive case (ii).  In this instance, the degree of competition is 
such that the firms carry out actions which reduce both their fitness levels.  An 
example is when two firms become engaged in a price war which ultimately reduces 
both their profit levels.  
 
The connections between agents evolve over time.  In other words, firms alter their 
strategies.  We can think of each firm as attempting to maximise its overall fitness 
level. In the model, the firm proceeds by a process of trial-and-error in altering its 
strategy for any given product.  The model is solved over a sequence of iterated steps, 
and at each step, for each agent one of its connections is chosen at random, and a new 
value is assigned to it. 
 
The properties of the model are in general invariant to the introduction of a 
considerable degree of sparseness into the connection matrix, Jij [16].  Further, the 
introduction of external shocks which are either common to the fitness of all agents or 
specific to individual agents does not alter the properties of the model, provided that 
the scale of the shocks is not such as to dominate the model [17]. 
 
2.3  Properties of the model 
 
Figure 1 shows the typical relationship between the frequency and the size of 
extinctions which emerges from the model. 
 




















Figure 1  Typical power law extinction size/frequency relationship from a singe 
50,000 iteration run of the standard model. 
 
The average estimated slope of the power law over a large number of individual 
solutions of the model is –2.43. 
 
Figure 2 shows the average relationship over 20 typical solutions of the basic model 
between the probability of extinction and the age of the agent. 
age (no. iterations)
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Figure 2 the number of agents which become extinct at iteration t as a proportion of 
the number of agents who reach age t, a proxy for extinction probability,  vs. no. of 
iterations. 
 
  83.  Knowledge and intent in agent behaviour 
 
There are two separate aspects in the model which relate to the extent of the firm’s 
knowledge about the external environment in which it operates: 
 
•  the amount of knowledge which the firm has about the impact of the strategies 
of other firms on its own fitness at any point in time 
•  the amount of knowledge which the firm has about the impact of changing its 
own strategy in order to alter the effect of the strategies of other firms on it. 
 
In the model described above, no matter how carefully an issue is examined, no 
matter how experienced a firm, the impact of any change which it makes to its 
strategy cannot be known in advance.   
 
The existing update rule for the effect of a firm’s strategy is that each agent has one of 
its Jji updated, i.e. assigned with a new value chosen at random in the interval [-1, 1].  
In other words, the effects of a firm’s strategy are updated by a random draw.   
 
We introduce two separate ways in which a firm is permitted to have knowledge and 
to act with intent: 
 
•  a parameter ε , ε > 0, is added to the value chosen at random in the uniform 
interval [-1, 1] (with the condition that  1 ≤ ji J ) 
•  the updated value is chosen at random from [-1, 1], but the agent is allowed to 
select the particular Jji which is updated, rather than it being chosen at random 
 
In the general version of the model described in section 2, the expected value of each 
updated  Jji is of course zero.  The first variant of the model permits the firm to 
exercise some control over the impact of changing its strategy by setting the expected 
value equal to ε , ε > 0
2. 
 
                                                 
2 subject to the constraint that the maximum value for any Jij is 1 
  9In other words, the firm does not have knowledge about which of the Jji to update in 
terms of its own best interests.  However, it is able to use its knowledge of the market 
to choose a change in strategy which on average will improve its overall fitness.  The 
higher the value of ε, the greater the degree of knowledge and control which an agent 
is able to exercise over the outcome of its strategy.   
 
Of course, the firm may ‘choose’ to update a particular Jji which is close to 1, and so 
only have a very small probability of improving its fitness.  Equally, the basic draw 
from [-1, 1] may allocate a value close to –1, so that even with the addition of ε there 
is still a negative impact on fitness.  But on average, its fitness will be improved. 
 
The second variant allows the firm to select the particular Jji which is updated.  In 
fact, we allow firms to select the one which is closest to –1.  In other words, the one 
which has the largest adverse impact on the fitness of the firm at that point in time.  
The updated value is chosen from [-1, 1], so the firm cannot act with knowledge as it 
is able to do in the first variant of the model.  However, it has more knowledge in this 
version in the sense that it knows the current effect of the impact of its existing 
strategies on its fitness. 
 
 
4. The  results 
 
We populate the model with 100 agents.  The size/frequency extinction relationship 
which emerges with this number of agents is very similar to that with large numbers 
of agents.  Each version of the model is solved 500 times over 50,000 steps (with the 
first 10,000 iterations disregarded), and the average of the results across the 500 
solutions is reported. 
 
In each case, we investigate the effect of allowing different numbers of agents to use 
the rules which give them more knowledge. 
 
We present results on: 
 
  10•  the exponent of a fitted extinction size/frequency power law 
•  the relationship between the probability of extinction and the age of the agent 
and the mean agent age at extinction 
•  the mean number of extinctions per 10,000 iterations of agents incapable of 
intent, i.e. using the purely random strategy update rule 




The variant in which agents are allowed to identify and update the individual 
connection which impacts most negatively on their fitness can be described very 
briefly.  Essentially, in this variant of the model, extinctions soon become extremely 
rare, and the average fitness of the agents approaches the maximum possible value of 
100.  
 
Intuitively, the reasons for this are as follows.  First, suppose that no extinctions take 
place.  The minimum value of the Jji for each agent is always the one which is 
updated.  If the new value is still the lowest for any given agent, it will be redrawn 
again on the next iteration, until it is greater in value than the Jji which was originally 
the second lowest value for that agent.  Eventually, all the Jji will take values greater 
than the one which was originally the highest, and then it too will be updated.  It is 
easy to see that in the absence of extinctions, all the Jji will in the limit approach the 
value of 1.   
 
Second, consider the mean agent and the initial conditions of its Jji .  These will be 
distributed uniformly in the interval [-1, 1], with an average value of zero.  In other 
words, the lowest value of the Jji will be  ω − , a value close to –1.   So, in the process 
of updating, it is very unlikely that a value will be chosen which is lower than  ω − , 
thereby bringing about the extinction of the agent.  In fact, the mean value of the 
updated Jji will be zero, so the overall fitness of the agent will on average rise from 
zero to  ω + .  In the next update, the lowest of the Jji for the agent will still be  ω −  , so 
even if a value is drawn which is lower, the agent will not become extinct.  In fact, the 
  11expected value of this update is also zero, so that the overall fitness of the agent will 
be close to  ω 2 + , and so on. 
  
The main results are therefore concerned with the rule which enables agents to update 
strategy in a way in which any updated connection has an expected value greater than 
zero. 
 
We examine the model under a variety of choices of ε and of the number of agents for 
which ε > 0.   For purposes of description, we designate the latter as NC, signifying the 
number of agents which is capable of exercising intent. 
 
As a benchmark, with the version of the model described in section 2, the exponent is 
2.43 (in absolute value), the mean agent age at extinction is 99 (i.e 99 iterations of the 
model), the mean agent fitness is 11.7, and the mean number of extinctions per 10,000 
iterations is 100. 
 
Table 1 shows the absolute value of the estimated exponent, β, of the log-log least 
squares regression of the size and frequency of extinctions. 
Table 1 
 
                              Exponent of extinction size/frequency power law  
ε / NC  1 10 25 50 75 100 
0.5 2.45 2.88 3.89 5.02 NEO NA 
0.35 2.44 2.76 3.66 4.94 NEO NA 
0.2 2.42 2.54 2.98 4.57 5.44 NEO 
0.15 2.42 2.49 2.70 3.77 5.14 NEO 
0.1 2.41 2.45 2.51 2.76 3.60 5.03 
0.075 2.42 2.44 2.48 2.58 2.82 3.44 
0.05 2.42 2.43 2.45 2.49 2.54 2.64 
0.01 2.41 2.42 2.42 2.42 2.43 2.43 
 
Note: The left hand column shows the value of ε and the top row shows the number of 
agents capable of intent (ε > 0). “NA” means that no extinctions at all are observed, 
and “NEO” means that not enough extinction observations occur to attempt to fit a 
power law. 
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For ε = 0.01, the power law relationship between size and frequency remains virtually 
the same as in the model in which agents have no knowledge at all on the impact of 
strategy changes.   Similarly, if just a single agent has this capability, the power law is 
not affected regardless of the value of ε. 
 
However, as the table shows quite clearly, as ε and NC are increased, the exponent 
generated by the model begins to deviate from its actual value.  Further, particularly 
for the combinations of ε and NC in the upper right hand part of Table 1, a power law 
ceases to give a reasonable description of the size-frequency relationship.  The 
behaviour of the model when most or all agents have knowledge is particularly 
erratic, and, indeed, at high values of both as ε and NC, extinctions effectively 
disappear from the model entirely. 
 
Figures 3a-e show the relationship between the probability of survival and the age of 
the agent for a range of values of ε.  Again, compared to the standard model, the 
ability of the model to replicate the stylised facts about this relationship breaks down 
as the value of ε increases. 
  13age (no. iterations)
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Figure 3    Plots showing P (the number of agents with intent who become extinct 
at iteration t as a proportion of the number of agents with intent who reach age t), a 
proxy for extinction probability,  vs. no. iterations for varying ε. (a) ε = 0.01 (b) ε = 
0.05 (c) ε = 0.1 (d) ε = 0.15 (e) ε = 0.2 .  NC = 100 for all. This becomes less well-
defined as fewer and fewer agents with intent actually become extinct. 
 
 
Tables 2a and 2b demonstrate the high potential returns available to agents capable of 
acquiring knowledge about the impact of their strategies.  Table 2a shows the mean 
age (in terms of numbers of iterations of the model) to extinction of agents without 
this capability, and Table 2b the mean age of agents with this capability. 
  14Table 2a 
 
                    Mean agent age at extinction for agents incapable of intent 
 /NC  1 10 25 50 75 100 




Note:  when N ls 10 defi her  ag ap  of intent 
ction 
f 99.   
an age of agents incapable of acquiring knowledge rises as the number of 
gents which are capable, for the following reason.  The ‘parenting’ rule in the model 
ε
0.5 102.10 125.09 157.36 200.85 238.39 NA 
0 1 .18 .47 .20 .65 NA 
0.2 100.17 107.35 120.58 144.39 167.71 NA 
0.15 99.99 104.69 113.48 129.82 147.42 NA 
0.1 99.56 102.58 107.56 116.90 127.38 NA 
.075 99.69 101.79 105.36 111.89 118.90 NA 
.05 99.54 101.20 103.16 107.36 111.64 NA 
0.01 99.21 99.78 100.30 100.96 101.65 NA 
C  equa 0, by  nition t e are no ents inc able
 





describes how the connections of new agents which replace those which become 
extinct are determined.  Essentially, a new agent copies the connections of a surviving 
one, with a small variation around them.  Now, the average fitness of agents capable 
of intent rises as ε and NC increase, and so every new agent, whether capable of 
exercising intent or not, begins with an expected fitness level which is higher, and so 










  15Table 2a, however, is in dramatic contrast with Table 2b. 
gent age at extinction for agents capable of intent  
 / NC  1 10 25 50 75 100
NA
35  2,07 7,1 26,4 29,3 23,9
5, 11, 17,
2,





ualitatively, as ε and NC are increased, the model begins to approach the limiting, 
ll information paradigm of neo-classical theory in which agents live for ever.   And 
del does not permit a great deal of knowledge 
cquisition before its properties begin to deviate from the stylised facts generated by 






      Mean a
ε
0.5  6,368 21,691 23,392 NA NA
0. 6 78  77 93 30 NA
0.2  540 753 1,630 710 852 783
0.15  333 391 556 1,087 1,898 973
0.1 
.075  172 179 193 221 257 301
.05  141 145 150 160 172 185
0.01  106 107 107 108 109 110
Q
fu
the returns to becoming capable of acquiring even a small amount of knowledge are 
very high.  The mean age at extinction when ε = 0.01 varies between 106 and 110, 
compared to a value of 99 when ε = 0 for all agents.  And when ε = 0.05, the mean 
age varies between 141 and 185. 
 
Overall, it is clear that the mo
a
the behaviour of actual firms.  The model properties continue to conform to the 
stylised facts if either: 
•  all agents are capable of acquiring a small amount of knowledge 
•  or a very small





  165. Conclusion 
tylised facts relating to firm survival and extinction: 
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exponent around –2 
rm becomes older, and eventually becomes generally 
 
An ag ution and extinction of firms based on basic 
rinciples of economics which is similar to, though not identical to, models in the 
 
rm’s strategy on the fitness of another particular firm.  Firms alter their strategy over 
imising 
gent of much of economics.  Nevertheless, agents acting in this way produce overall 
 act with a 
ertain amount of intent.  However, their cognitive ability is still very much less than 
 acquiring knowledge, for even a small amount 
ads to a sharp increase in the mean agent age at extinction for agents with 
 
There are two important s
 
•  the size/frequency of extinction relationship follows a power law
•  the probability of extinction is highest in the early time period of a firm’s life.  
This falls as the fi
invariant to the age of a firm 
ent-based model of the evol
p
biological literature has properties which conform closely to the empirical evidence.  
 
Firms are connected by a matrix whose elements measure the net impact of a given
fi
time.  However, they have no explicit knowledge at any point in time either of the true 
impact on their fitness of either their own or other firms’ current strategies.  Further, 
they have no knowledge of the effect which changing their strategy will have. 
 
Their cognitive ability is in very sharp contrast to the explicit, rational max
a
outcomes which are compatible with the stylised facts on firm extinctions. 
 
We allow firms to obtain a limited amount of knowledge, and to be able to
c
that of an explicit rational maximiser. 
 
There are very considerable returns to
le
knowledge compared to those without.  Indeed, we find that as both the amount of 
knowledge available to firms increases and as the number of firms capable of 
  17acquiring such knowledge rises, the lifespan of agents begins to approach the limiting, 
full information paradigm of neo-classical theory in which agents live for ever.   
 
However, even with relatively low levels of knowledge and numbers of agents 
capable of acquiring it, the model ceases to have properties which are compatible with 
the two key stylised facts on firm extinctions.  The clear implication is that firms have 
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